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NOTE
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 301 AND
CONGRESSIONAL ACTS: WHEN DOES AN ACT
"OTHERWISE PROVIDE"?
During the congressional hearings on the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, few subjects sparked as much concern and disagreement as
that of presumptions.' The significant role presumptions can play in
litigation sparked the congressional debate. Presumptions can shift the
burden of proof2 and, therefore, possibly dictate the outcome of a trial.3
Rule 301, 4 which emerged from this congressional concern and dis-
agreement, has descended into obscurity despite the importance of pre-
sumptions. A number of reasons could explain this phenomenon.5 An
1 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 300.01 (2d ed. 1981).
2 The expression "burden of proof" actually encompasses two different burdens: the
"burden of production" and the "burden of persuasion." J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON
SENSE AND COMMON LAw 175-77 (1947). The burden of production is also called the burden
of "bringing forward evidence." McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a
Burden ofPersuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1382 (1955). The burden of production requires
that the party with the burden on a given issue come forward with sufficient evidence to
enable "a reasonable jury" to find for him on the issue. Id at 1383. In short, the burden of
production is the onus placed on a party to avoid a directed verdict. See J. MACUIRE, supra,
at 177.
Commentators have characterized the burden of production as a judicial means of
preventing irrational jury findings. See McNaughton, supra, at 1382. Even in nonjury pro-
ceedings, however, judges frequently refer to the burden or its "sufficiency" standard. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F,2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906
(198 1) ("sufficient evidence to demonstrate" nonexistence of presumed fact deemed adequate
to rebut presumption in nonjury proceeding).
In contrast to the burden of production, the burden of persuasion does not entail an
intermediate judicial determination ofevidentiary "sufficiency." Instead, the burden requires
the party to convince the factfinder of the truth of his version of the facts. See J. MAGUIRE,
supra, at 177. Additionally, the burden of persuasion is appropriate, and indeed necessary, in
both jury and nonjury proceedings. The required degree of persuasion can vary from a "bare
preponderance," the typical civil level, to "beyond a reasonable doubt," the criminal level.
See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 502-05 (4th ed. 1978).
3 See infra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
4 FED. R. EVID. 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast.
5 For example, rule 301 only applies to a limited number of the presumptions used in
federal courts. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Furthermore, many judges, law-
yers and scholars are hostile to the rule's premise that presumptions subject to the rule should
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inherent ambiguity in the rule renders the rule's scope unclear and may
offer a partial explanation: by its terms, rule 301 does not apply to pre-
sumptions "otherwise provided for by Act of Congress. ' 6 The federal
courts have failed to articulate when an act of Congress provides for an
alternative to rule 301. 7 Until the courts explain when rule 301 applies,
its scope will remain unclear and its use neglected-a fate hardly appro-
priate for such a potentially important rule that has been the cause of so
much concern.
I
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF PRESUMPTIONS: RULE
301 AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Scholars generally agree on the basic analytical framework of pre-
sumptions. The concept of conditional compulsion underlies this frame-
work: if the proponent of a presumption can prove specified basic facts,"
the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, must find specified presumed
facts unless the opponent of the presumption successfully rebuts the pre-
sumed facts. 9 Although in agreement on these fundamentals, scholars
disagree on the crucial issue of the quantum of evidence that the oppo-
nent must provide to rebut successfully presumed facts once the propo-
nent has established the basic facts.10
be applied uniformly. See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciaq
, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings I/ (memorandum submitted on behalf of the Washington
Council of Lawyers) (presumptions are a matter of state policy, and federal courts should
therefore follow state practice); 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, § 300.01 ("Some felt
it was undesirable to have a single general rule applicable to all types of presumptions; and
that the effect of presumptions should vary and be based upon the reason for the creation of a
particular presumption.").
6 FED. R. EVID. 301.
7 See infra notes 66-78, 79-96 and accompanying text.
8 Basic facts can be established by pleadings, stipulation, judicial notice, compelling
evidence, or judicial findings. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 702 (1942).
9 See M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL § 301.6, at 46
(1981); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 536 (1977) (distinguishing infer-
ences from presumptions); Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order Out of Chaos, 58
B.U.L. REv. 527, 528 (1978); Ladd, Presumptions in CivilActions, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 277.
Conditional compulsion distinguishes presumptions from inferences and so-called con-
clusive presumptions. Inferences are merely permissive logical conclusions without the com-
pelling force of law, and conclusive presumptions are essentially substantive rules of law that
cannot be rebutted. Note, Presumptions According to Purpose: A Functional Approach, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 1079, 1082-83 (1981). Conditional compulsion inheres in the very nature and definition
of presumptions, whether statutorily or judicially created, and whether used in a jury or non-
jury context. See, e.g., Whitman v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1055, 1057 (4th Cir. 1980) (statutory
presumption used in an administrative, nonjury context); In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp., 11
Bankr. 515, 519 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (attribute of conditional compulsion inherent in presump-
tions that rule 301 governs).
10 See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 301.10, at 52-54; Louisell, Construing Rule 301:
Instructing theJug on Presumptions in CivilActions andProceedings, 63 VA. L. REV. 281,301 (1977).
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The traditional school of thought, the "Thayer" camp, contends
that a presumption should shift only the burden of productionII on the
issue of the presumed facts, and that the ultimate burden of persuasion
should remain on the proponent.12 Thus, the opponent of the presump-
tion need only produce evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed facts in order to rebut the presump-
tion.' 3 Upon a showing of this evidence, a Thayer presumption disap-
pears altogether, like a "bursting bubble." Advocates of this approach
argue that a "bursting bubble" presumption is easily administered,' 4
and is consistent with the only valid reason for creating and using pre-
sumptions: forcing the opponent to produce evidence.15
The reformist, or "Morgan" camp, on the other hand, believes that
a presumption should have a stronger effect: once the proponent estab-
11 See supra note 2.
12 See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 498-99.
13 See id; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 9, at 531 (credibility of rebuttal evidence irrele-
vant); Louisell, supra note 10, at 301 (same). But see Note, supra note 9, at 1084 ("any" evi-
dence sufficient to rebut Thayer or traditional presumptions).
Although traditional presumptions appear technically inappropriate in nonjury proceed-
ings, judicial or administrative courts sitting without a jury can and do use them. See supra
note 2. Furthermore, traditional presumptions can play a decisive role in nonjury proceed-
ings because the concept of legal compulsion inheres in the definition of presumption itself.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Thus, a judge or administrative official acting in
a quasi-judicial capacity must accept the presumed facts of a traditional presumption if the
proponent has established the basic facts and the opponent has failed to produce any evi-
dence establishing the nonexistence of the presumed facts. See, e.g., Whitman v. Califano, 617
F.2d 1055, 1057 (4th Cir. 1980).
Courts have applied variants of the pure traditional model. They have done so by fixing
the level of evidence necessary for rebuttal either above or below the traditional "sufficiency"
level: to strengthen the presumption, they have raised the level of rebuttal; to weaken the
presumption, they have lowered the level. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 392 (5th Cir. 1981) (an indecisive, or perhaps confused, court
first raised the level to "substantial evidence" and then lowered it to "some evidence"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982). A variant popular in New York is the so-called "substantial
evidence rule." Note, supra note 9, at 1089.
The level of evidence needed to rebut a Thayer presumption in a nonjury case is not
clear. Thejudge could require, and still remain faithful to Thayer doctrine, "any" or "some"
evidence in rebuttal. See In re Torneo, I Bankr. 673, 678-79 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("some" evidence
required; credibility irrelevant). Indeed, the higher the required amount of evidence needed
for rebuttal, for example, a requirement of "substantial" evidence, the more important the
credibility of the rebuttal evidence becomes; and as the burden shifted to the presumption
opponent becomes more like a burden of persuasion, the more closely the presumption resem-
bles a reformist presumption. If a judge or administrative official were to require "clear,
cogent and convincing evidence," see NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 243, 297 (9th
Cir. 1978), he would be imposing a burden of persuasion on the presumption opponent and,
therefore, applying a reformist presumption. See J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN
&J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1039 (6th ed. 1973).
1" See Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5,
18 (1959).
15 See I D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, sup-a note 9, at 554-55 (proponent uses presump-
tion to "smoke out" adversary).
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lishes the basic facts, the burden of persuasion,1 6 as well as the burden of
production, on the issue of the presumed facts should shift to the oppo-
nent. Thus, upon proof of the basic facts the opponent must convince
the factfinder, whether judge or jury, of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed facts by a preponderance of the evidence.' 7 The reformists argue
that this stronger effect is consistent with the true purpose of presump-
tions-allocating the burden of persuasion to promote judicial and legis-
lative policies. The reformists identify three such policies: (1) a social
policy of handicapping the party advancing a disfavored contention;",
(2) a policy of ensuring fairness in litigation by forcing the party with
superior access to the evidence relevant to a particular issue to prove
that issue or, conversely, relieving the party with inferior access to the
evidence of the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue; 19 and (3) a policy of
accounting for probability by forcing the party who would benefit from
an exception to a perceived statistical norm to prove that he fits within
the exception. 20 The reformists accurately point out that these policies
are the considerations that have traditionally guided judges in allocat-
ing the burden of persuasion in the first instance.2 I
Whether a judge chooses to accord a presumption a traditionalist
"bursting bubble" effect or a stronger reformist effect may have signifi-
cant practical consequences. First, the choice could determine whether
the issue of the existence of the presumed facts will go to the jury or
whether the judge will instruct the jury that it must find for the oppo-
nent on the issue.2 2 Second, the choice could decide those issues that the
16 See supra note 2.
17 See, e.g., R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 499; M. GRAHAM,
supra note 9, § 301.6, at 47; Note, supra note 9, at 1086-87. In order to rebut a Morgan
presumption, the opponent of the presumption must disprove the presumed fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Id
18 See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343, at 806-07 (2d ed. E.
Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; see also id § 337, at 786-87.
19 See MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 343, at 806-07; Louisell, supra note 10, at 292.
20 See MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 343, at 806-07.
21 See id; see also 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 5122, at 555-57 (1977) (burden of proof allocated according to three "p's": policy,
access to proof, and probability); Allen, Preumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 843, 850 (1981) ("Presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion are simply affirma-
tive defenses that are created for the same reasons of policy that generally inform the decision
to allocate burdens of persuasion. Indeed, whether an affirmative defense goes by its usual
label or that of a presumption seems entirely fortuitous."); Cleary, supra note 14, at 21 ("gov-
erning considerations" for allocating the "elements of a case" between litigants and for using
presumptions "are identical: policy, fairness and probability").
The reasons for allocating to a party the burden of persuasion on a particular issue,
either in the first instance or through a presumption, would also justify allocating to the party
the burden of production on the issue. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 7.8, at 251-53 (2d ed. 1977). For criticisms of both the Thayer and Morgan ap-
proaches see Note, supra note 9, at 1085-88.
22 The choice between the traditional approach to presumptions, with its low rebuttal
standard, and the reformist approach is particularly important to the proponent of an arbi-
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factfinder, whether judge or jury, could not decide for itself.23 Third, the
strength of a presumption often significantly affects the trial strategy of
both the proponent and the opponent. 24 Finally, the choice may deter-
mine whether the parties actually litigate the presumptive issue.25
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence embodies the tradition-
alist "bursting bubble" approach.26 A federal judge must give a pre-
trary presumption. Arbitrary presumptions are those for which there is no logical connection
between the basic and presumed facts. If the proponent of a nonarbitrary traditional pre-
sumption suffers an adverse ruling on the rebuttal of the presumption, the logical connection
between the basic and presumed facts may still suffice to avoid a directed verdict. In the case
of arbitrary traditional presumptions, however, if the proponent only introduces evidence
establishing the basic facts and the opponent introduces evidence, however incredible, "suffi-
cient" to establish the nonexistence of the presumed facts, see supra notes 2, 12, 13 and accom-
panying text, ajudge will probably direct a finding for the opponent. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5122, at 563-64. The reformist rule would dictate a different
result both because greater rebuttal evidence would be necessary and because judges are often
reluctant to direct a finding in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion. See R. FIELD,
B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 532; Note, supra note 9, at 1086 (Morgan ap-
proach precludes directed verdicts against proponents of presumptions).
23 When the factfinder cannot decide for itself on the issue of the presumed facts-that
is, when it perceives that the probabilities for and against the existence of the presumed facts
are equal--then it is in equipoise. In such situations, the party with the burden of persuasion
will lose. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supa note 21, § 5122, at 558. Thus, when
the proponent of a presumption establishes the basic facts and the factfinder is in equipoise on
the presumed facts, the opponent in a traditional presumption jurisdiction will win; in a
reformist jurisdiction, however, he will lose because he bears the burden of persuasion.
24 See Martin, InherentJudicial Power- Flexibiliy Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules
o(Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REv. 167, 197-98 (1979). For example, in the tax arena, in which the
government enjoys the benefit of a reformist presumption of the correctness of tax assess-
ments, see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text, the government need only introduce its
assessment into evidence to force the taxpayer to prove nonliability. Id
25 When an opponent of a presumption does not have access to evidence bearing on the
presumed facts, a presumption can effectively prevent him from litigating these facts and
force him to rely on an affirmative defense. The cases involving the presumption of a union's
continued majority status illustrate the effect. See infta notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
The employer, in rebutting the reformist presumption of continued majority status, must
overcome the difficulty that the relevant evidence is in the union's possession. See R.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 110, 114 (1976). Thus, the employer is often forced to
rely exclusively on the affirmative defense of his good faith belief in union minority. See infia
note 38 and accompanying text. The issue of the union's actual status remains unlitigated.
See Note, NLRB Detemination oflncumbent Unions' Majority Status, 54 IND. L.J. 651, 665 (1979).
Conversely, if the presumption received a weaker traditional effect, the union would retain
the burden of persuasion on the majority-status issue and this issue would be litigated more
often. Apparently sensitive to this, the NLRB in Stoner Rubber Co. gave the majority-status
presumption a traditional effect, and set the standard of rebuttal at "sufficient evidence to
cast serious doubt on the union's continued majority status". 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959).
26 See Reeve v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 522 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982); Legille v.
Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 301.6, at 46; 1 D. LOUI-
SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 555 (credibility of rebuttal irrelevant); MCCORMICK,
supra note 18, § 343, at 105 (Rule 301 "states the 'bursting bubble' theory in its pure form.");
10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, § 301.01[1], at 6 ("Congress adopted an unsullied
Thayer theory in Rule 301 . . ..'); see also S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 81 (2d ed. 1977) (sufficiency as standard of rebuttal); Louisell, supra
note 10, at 318-19 (analyzing memo sent to Congress by Edward Cleary, Reporter of the
Advisory Committee, in which Cleary interpreted rule 301 as a traditionalist rule, with a
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sumption the weak effect of shifting only the burden of production
unless the presumption fits into one of the rule's exceptions. Rule 301
contains three exceptions. 27 First, it does not apply to criminal cases,
but only to "civil actions and proceedings. '28 Second, rule 301 does not
govern diversity cases in which state law provides the rule of decision for
the element of a claim or defense to which the presumption applies.29
Finally, rule 301 does not apply when an act of Congress provides
sufficiency standard of rebuttal, making the credibility of rebuttal irrelevant). But see U.S.
Indus./Fed. Metal Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 102 S. Ct.
1312, 1316 n.5 (1982) (suggesting that a rule 301 presumption must be rebutted by "substan-
tial evidence"); 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5122, at 571-73 (rule 301
adopts an intermediate ground between a reformist and a traditional rule).
Two commentators have suggested that the federal courts could conceivably interpret
rule 301 to permit variants of the traditional presumptions. See supra note 13; see also Hecht &
Pinzler, supra note 9, at 554-55 ("The ambiguity of the language [of rule 301] may permit
federal courts to adopt a Thayer variant rather than the 'bursting bubble' approach") (foot-
note omitted). They have proved to be prophetic. See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 392 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982). Such
Thayer-variant interpretations of rule 301 have gained favor in the nonjury proceedings of
the bankruptcy courts. See In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp., 11 Bankr. 515, 519 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
("some evidence"); In re Eichorn, 11 Bankr. 81, 83 (D. Mass. 1981) (same). One bankruptcy
court labeled rule 301 a Thayer "bursting bubble theory," but gave it a Thayer variant level
of rebuttal of "some evidence." In re Tomeo, I Bankr. 673, 678-79 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
27 The use of the term "presumption" in rule 301 limits the rule's operative scope. For
example, rule 301 does not apply to inferences. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
Nor does rule 301 apply to so-called conclusive presumptions. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUEL-
LER, supra note 9, at 534-35, 539; supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Nor does the rule
apply to an "assumption"-the allocation of the burden of persuasion in the first instance,
without the aid of a presumption. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21,
§ 5123, at 574 ("[Rule 301]. . .does not. . . alter the control of courts over the allocation of
the burden of proof [persuasion]; i.e., the power to create 'assumptions.' Thus, while a court
could not create a presumption that placed the burden of proof on the opponent, it could,
under its decisional power over the substantive law, allocate to him the burden of proof on
the issue.") (footnote omitted); id § 5124, at 589 (assumptions are not presumptions because
they do not depend upon establishing basic facts); see also S. SALTLBURG & K. REDDEN, supra
note 26, at 92 ("[T]he line separating presumptions that shift burdens of persuasion from
rulings placing burdens of persuasion in the first instance [assumptions] is not clear. .... ).
Thus, rule 301 does not affect the allocation of the burden of persuasion to a plaintiff on the
elements of his claim, nor to a defendant on his affirmative defenses. Courts often justify their
allocation of the burden of persuasion through conventional presumption analysis when they
are, in reality, assigning the burden as an assumption. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1426 (1982).
Courts and legislatures often interpret so-called "prima facie" cases, which can be cre-
ated either by statute or judicial decision, as the equivalents of presumptions. See Pennzoil
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 392 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1142 (1982); In re Tomeo, 1 Bankr. 673, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1979); CAL. EVID. CODE § 602
(West 1966). Rule 301, therefore, can be interpreted to limit the effect a court can give to
these "prima facie" cases. But see In re Friedman, 436 F. Supp. 234, 236 n.1 (D. Md. 1977)
("The Federal Rules of Evidence.. . do not define the effect of prima facie evidence.'). For a
list of federal statutory "prima facie" cases, see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note
21, § 5123, at 579 n.29.
28 FED. R. EvID. 301.
29 Id 301,302.
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otherwise.30
Only rarely have the federal courts addressed explicitly and clearly
resolved whether an act of Congress provides for a reformist presump-
tion.3' Consequently, the case law does not provide one clear test for
defining the parameters of this exception to rule 301. In the limited
number of cases addressing rule 301 and arising under federal statutes,
the federal courts have instead articulated (often obliquely), or implic-
itly applied, two different tests.
II
THE TESTS IMPLICIT IN THE CASE LAW
A. The Policy Test
The "policy" test can be stated as follows: If the purposes of or the
policies underlying the act are better served by giving the presumption a
reformist effect, the act "otherwise provides" for this greater effect.
Courts have applied this test in several refusal to bargain cases arising
under the National Labor Relations Act,32 most notably in NLRB v.
Tahoe Nugget, Inc. 3 In Tahoe Nugget, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the ap-
plication of the NLRB's nonstatutory presumption3 4 of a union's contin-
ued majority support.35 According to this presumption, once the Board
establishes either that the Board certified or that the employer volun-
tarily recognized the incumbent union over a year before the employer
refused to bargain with it, a presumption arises that the union enjoyed
majority support when the employer refused to bargain. 36 The court
ruled that this presumption shifted the burden of persuasion on the issue
of majority support to the employer.3 7 To meet this burden, the em-
30 I 301.
31 Only the Court of Claims has addressed and resolved the issue. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Transp. v. United States, 643 F.2d 758, 763 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The Court of Claims' test consists
of a three-fold inquiry to determine the effect of the act in question: (1) whether the act
expressly requires the burden of persuasion on specified facts to shift once certain basic facts
have been established; (2) whether the legislative history "implicitly require[s] such a result";
and (3) whether shifting the burden of persuasion through a presumption would place the
burden on the party with better access to relevant evidence. Id
32 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
33 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
34 See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5123, at 124-25 (Supp. 1982).
35 584 F.2d at 297. The majority support issue is an element of a refusal to bargain
charge: "To sustain [a refusal to bargain] charge, the General Counsel must show the union
represented a majority of the unit employees when the employer refused to bargain." Id
36 Sce id
37 Id The General Counsel initially bore the burden of persuasion. See id (to sustain a
refusal to bargain charge, General Counsel must show union majority status); see also NLRB
v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981) ("In
an unfair lhbor practice proceeding. . . the General Counsel [must prove] by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that an unfair labor practice has occurred"). The shift of the burden of
persuasion on the majority-support issue from the General Counsel to the employer demon-
strates that this presumption is indeed a presumption and not an "assumption." See supra note
1982] 1091
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ployer had to convince the factfinder 38 by "clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence" 39 that either the union did not in fact enjoy majority
support when the employer refused to bargain or that when the em-
ployer refused he entertained a good faith reasonable doubt of the
union's majority status. 40
The Ninth Circuit rejected rule 30141 out of hand, stating that
"[o]nly a superficial reading of the rule" could prohibit the persuasion
burden from shifting,42 and asserted that courts had approved the pre-
sumption's force both before and after the Federal Rules of Evidence. 43
The court suggested that a weaker presumption would encourage em-
ployers to refuse to bargain and would foster industrial strife.44
27. Thus, it fits within the operative scope of rule 301. See id But see 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, JR.,supra note 21, § 5124, at 134 n.33 (Supp. 1982) (majority-support presumption
probably an "assumption").
38 In NLRB proceedings, the Board and its administrative officials are the factfinders.
See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5123, at 100 (Supp. 1981). Because
these are nonjury proceedings, technically traditional presumptions are inappropriate. See
supra note 13. But see NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981) (presumption of majority support "deemed rebutted" when the
employer in an NLRB proceeding presents "sufficient evidence to demonstrate" union's mi-
nority status).
39 584 F.2d at 297. This level of persuasion is more demanding than the normal civil
standard of "by a preponderance of the evidence."
40 d; see alo NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 813 (2d
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
818 (1977) (citing Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.),cert. denied, 398
U.S. 929 (1979)).
Proof of the employer's good faith reasonable doubt is not truly a rebuttal in that it does
not establish the nonexistence of the presumed fact of actual majority support. See supra note
9 and accompanying text. Therefore, as some courts have suggested, proof of a good faith
reasonable doubt is an affirmtive defense. See NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 579
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981). This may explain the judicial disregard of
rule 301 in this context, for rule 301 applies to presumptions, not to affirmative defenses.
41 The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in unfair labor practice hearings "so far as
practicable." 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). Professors Wright and Graham argue that because
the NLRB does not use a jury, see supra note 38, and because rule 301 regulates only the
relationship between judge and jury, the use of rule 301 in unfair labor practice proceedings is
not "practicable." 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5123, at 124-25 (Supp.
1982).
42 584 F.2d at 297.
43 Id
44 Id at 301-04. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the importance of promoting industrial
peace in NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980),cert. denid, 451 U.S.
906 (1981). The Silver Spur court described the presumption's effect in traditionalist terms. See
supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. For example, it concluded that "[a]n employer
may rebut the presumption by presenting sufjient evidence to demonstrate that the union was
actually in the minority or that the employer had a good faith reasonable doubt of the
union's majority support at the time of the refusal to bargain." 623 F.2d at 577 (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the court suggested that, despite the presumption, the General Counsel
always bears the burden of persuasion. Id This traditionalist description does not represent
repudiation of the reformist rule laid down in Tahoe Nugget. Instead, it reflects sloppy and
inappropriate use of presumption terminology. For example, the concept of sufficiency of
evidence is inappropriate in the NLRB nonjury context. See supra notes 2, 13, 38. Further-
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The federal courts have implicitly sanctioned the use of the policy
test in cases that concern assessable tax penalties and arise under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.45 Presuming the propriety of
a tax assessment is of judicial rather than statutory origin.46 When the
government introduces a tax assessment into evidence, a presumption
arises that the taxpayer has committed all of the acts statutorily re-
quired for liability.47
Before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts
ruled that this presumption shifted to the taxpayer both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion on essentially the entire issue
of liability. The leading pre-rules case is Psay v. United States. 48 In Psaly,
more, the court cited Tahoe Nugget in support of its use of the sufficiency language. 623 F.2d
at 577. Tahoe Nugget does not contain any such language. Indeed, it stands for the proposition
that the presumption shifts the burdens of persuasion and production to the employer on the
issue of union majority support. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Thus, the
sufficiency standard is inapplicable.
The First Circuit has managed to avoid rule 301 in labor relations cases without resort-
ing to a Tahoe Nugget policy analysis. See Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 45 (1st Cir.
1981). The court held that rule 301 did not limit the effect of the so-called presumption of the
propriety of a bargaining unit, because the presumption was a "substantive, not a procedural,
presumption such as is set forth in rule 301." Id
45 The penalty provision relevant here is I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1979), which provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully ac-
count for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade
or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of
the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No
penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 for any offense to which this
section is applicable.
46 See 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, § 301.02, at 14 n.5 (presumption as
creation of common law).
47 See Osborn v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9302 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
("The presumption that the assessment was correct in all aspects, necessariy inclusive ofallstatu-
tooy elements was not rebutted.") (emphasis added). The statutory elements of liability are: (1)
that the taxpayer was required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over withholding
taxes to the government and (2) that he willfully failed to do so. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West Supp.
1979); see supra note 45.
48 442 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1971). In Psaty, the taxpayer brought a refund suit to recover
the portion of the assessed penalties that he had paid and the government counterclaimed for
the balance of the assessment. Id at 1156. The Third Circuit ruled that the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion on the issue of liability were, with respect to the taxpayer's refund
claim, initially on the taxpayer and, with respect to the government's counterclaim, initially
on the government. Id at 1158-60. Furthermore, the court held that the government estab-
lished a prima facie case on its counterclaim by offering into evidence the certification of the
Commissioner's assessment and thereby shifted both burdens to the taxpayer. Id at 1159-60;
see a/so United States v. Sefansky, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5640, 5640-41 (E.D. Mich. 1965)
(Introduction of the Administrative Assessment File into evidence in a government collection
action "placed the burden on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the one hundred percent penalty imposed by Section 6672 was erroneously assessed
against him."). The government need not introduce its assessment into evidence, for the as-
sessment is not a prerequisite for liability. See id However, Psaty suggests that unless the
government introduces its assessment into evidence, the burden of persuasion on the govern-
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the Third Circuit defended this presumption by asserting that it is more
probable than not that the taxpayer ultimately will be liable.49 Further-
more, the court stressed that the presumption promoted the sound pub-
lic policies embodied in the Internal .Revenue Code: it required
taxpayers to meet the Code's bookkeeping obligations by accounting for
the taxpayer's better access to relevant evidence, and required corporate
officers to explain their failure to-perform the duties imposed by the
Code.50 Finally, in defense of according the presumption a reformist
effect, the court stated that "[w]here a presumption owes its origin, as
here, to an important public policy, it should operate to fix the burden
of persuasion, as well as the burden of going forward." 51 Even after the
passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts have often over-
looked rule 301 and continued to give a Morgan effect to the
presumption.5 2
B. The Language-Consisteny Test
The "language-consistency" test can be stated as follows: If the
court must give the presumption a reformist effect to render it consistent
with the language of the act, the act "otherwise provides" for this
greater effect. In Solder Removal Co. v. International Trade Commission5 3 the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals implicitly sanctioned this test in
analyzing the statutory presumption of patent validity.54 The presump-
tion provides that once a patentee introduces into evidence the letters of
ment's counterclaim will not shift to the taxpayer. 442 F.2d at 1159-60. This shifting of the
burden of persuasion demonstrates that the presumption of correctness is indeed a presump-
tion, not an "assumption." See supra note 27. But see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., "ufra
note 21, § 5124, at 107 n.22, 108 n.30 (Supp. 1981). Thus, it fits within the operative scope of
rule 301.
This presumption of correctness, however, which is often applied in contexts other than
§ 6672 penalty actions, appears to be used more like an assumption than a true presumption.
See, e.g., Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 272 (Fay, J., concurring), 274, 276-77 (Tan-
nenwald, J., concurring) (1980) (considering effect of statutory notice of deficiency in income
reconstruction case). Thus, the procedural status of this "presumption," and consequently
the applicability or nonapplicability of rule 301, varies by court and by statutory context.
Compare United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 15-16 (Ist Cir. 1973) (assumption analysis in
case in which government sues on assessment to collect taxes) with Herbert v. Commissioner,
377 F.2d 65, 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1967) (presumption of correctness treated as true presumption in
case involving an omission from gross income). See generaly Llorente v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 260, 273 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
49 442 F.2d at 1160.
50 Id
51 Id (citing Morgan, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 69, 83 (1933)).
52 See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 561 F.2d 162, 165 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The burden is
upon the party assessed to prove that it was not. . . responsible [for withholding taxes] or
that its failure to pay the taxes was not willful.').
53 582 F.2d 628 (1978).
54 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) provides: "A patent shall be presumed valid.. . . The bur-
den of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting
such invalidity."
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patent issued to him by the Patent and Trademark Office, the burden of
proof shifts to the party challenging its validity.55 The court in Solder
Removal ruled that this presumption shifted the burden of persuasion on
the issue of patent validity from the patentee to the party asserting
invalidity.56
In rejecting the argument that rule 301 prohibits such a shift, the
court relied on the text of the statute: "The burden of establishing inva-
lidity of a patent. . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."'57
The court reasoned that placing the burden of persuasion on the pat-
entee "would involve total disregard of [this statutory language]." 58
The court concluded that the patent act took "precedence" over rule
301.59 The Supreme Court, in Turner Elkhorn Afining Co. v. User, 60 ex-
hibited a similar unwillingness to look beyond an act's language when it
gave a Thayer effect to two presumptions in the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969.61
55 See Saginaw Prods. Corp. v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 615 F.2d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980);
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 713 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
987 (1975) (ruling that patentee has the initial burden of proving the validity of his patent);
see also 3 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 97.21,
at 394-95 (3d ed. 1977) ("[Flrom the issuance of the letters patent, it is presumed that a
claimed invention which is 'novel' and 'useful,' amounts to a 'discovery or invention' over
what was already known in the prior art [and therefore the patent is valid].").
56 582 F.2d at 632-33 n.3. The federal courts often disagree about the proper level of
persuasion that the party asserting invalidity must meet. Compare Saf-Gard Prods. v. Service
Parts, 532 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) ("clear and convincing
evidence') with Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1055 (1976) ("preponderance of the evidence").
57 582 F.2d at 633 n.8 (relying on the last sentence of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1976)).
58 Id
59 Id The result reached in Solder Removal can be justified without presumption analysis.
One can reasonably argue that § 282, taken in its entirety, creates an "assumption," not a
presumption, in favor of the patentee and that therefore rule 301 does not apply. See 21 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., sufira note 21, § 5123, at 576-77 n.13;.wpra note 27. Indeed, the
court in SolderRemoval supported the propriety of such an afialysis: "the burden of persuasion
is and remains always upon the party asserting invalidity." 582 F.2d at 633 (emphasis added).
The structure of § 282 lends further support to this analysis. For example, the statute explic-
itly labels invalidity as a defense "to be pleaded" by the party asserting invalidity. 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1976); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1256
(8th Cir. 1980); 3 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, sufra note 55, § 97.04, at 378-80. Since the
party who pleads a proposition normally must prove it, see infia note 67, § 282 suggests that at
the pleading stage the burden of persuasion must fall upon the party attacking the patent.
60 428 U.S. 1, 26, (1976).
61 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides: "If a miner who is suffering or suf-
fered from pneumoconiosis [black lung disease] was employed for ten years or more in one or
more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that [the disease] arose out of such
employment." 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) provides: "[I]f a deceased miner was
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease
there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to [black lung disease]."
The court ruled peremptorily that "[e]ach presumption is explicitly rebuttable, and the
effect of each is simply to shift the burden of going forward with evidence from the claimant
to the operator." 428 U.S. at 27 (citing rule 301). Clearly it could have put forth a Tahoe
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C. Conflict Between the Poliy Test and the Language Consistenqy Test
The "policy" test62 appears to be fundamentally incompatible with
this "language-consistency" test. The policy test ties the effect of pre-
sumptions, whether created judicially, administratively, or statutorily,
to policies underlying congressional acts, while the language-consistency
test limits the effect of a presumption to the effect that the words of the
act dictate. A court applying the latter test would be unwilling to look
beyond the four corners of the act.
Although these two tests appear fundamentally incompatible, on
one occasion the Supreme Court has suggested a willingness to apply
both tests to the same presumption. In Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,63 a
case involving a land dispute between Indians and whites, the Court
implicitly acknowledged that the statutory presumption in issue 64 would
have passed the "language consistency" test as well as the "policy"
test.6 5
Nugget or Psaty-like policy justification for shifting the burden of persuasion from the claim-
ant-coal miner to the mine operator, seesupra notes 32-52 and accompanying text. This justi-
fication would have been straightforward and grounded in the declared purpose of the Act:
"It is the purpose of the bill . . . to protect the health and safety of coal miners, and to
combat the steady toll of life, limb, and lung, which terrorizes so many unfortunate families."
H.R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2503. To ensure most effectively compensation to an afflicted miner and his family and to
promote most effectively this statutory purpose, the statutory presumptions should operate to
relieve the claimant-miners of the burden of persuasion. Such a policy justification is particu-
larly strong for a presumption added several years after Congress passed the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). The years immedi-
ately after the Act's passage witnessed few successful claims, and the miner's major problem
was evidentiary. The purpose of the presumption was to remedy this problem and, therefore,
it should shift the burden of persuasion. See United States Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022,
1028 (5th Cir. 1979) (construing § 921 (c) (4) and concluding, without policy justification, that
it shifts the burden of persuasion).
The unwillingness to explore statutory purposes or policies exhibited in Turner Elhom
Mining Co. has appeared in other statutory contexts as well. See, e.g., Poncy v. Johnson &
Johnson, 460 F. Supp. 795, 803 (D.N.J. 1978) (assuming that nonuse of a trademark for two
consecutive years gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of abandonment under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127(a), and concluding that it does not shift the burden of persuasion to the party denying
abandonment) (citing rule 301).
62 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
63 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
64 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1976) provides:
In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on
one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon
the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title
in himself from the fact of previous possession or ownership.
Thus, the basic fact of this statutory presumption is prior possession or ownership by Indians,
and the presumed fact is present Indian title. See id
65 [I]n view of the evident purpose of the statute and its use of the term "pre-
sumption" which the "white man" must overcome, we are in agreement with
the two courts below that § 194 contemplates the non-Indian's shouldering
the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of producing evidence once the
tribe has made out its prima facie case of prior title or possession.
442 U.S. at 669.
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III
AN ANALYSIS OF THESE TESTS
A. The Poliy Test
The policy test 66 is inadequate because it necessarily engenders con-
fusion and inconsistent treatment of the same presumption. Three con-
siderations support this pessimistic conclusion. First, federal judges are
not always sensitive to the same statutory policies; one judge may recog-
nize a statutory policy that requires allocation of the burden of persua-
sion through a presumption to the opponent of the presumption, while
another judge may not recognize such a policy and would allocate the
burden to the proponent on other grounds.67 The effect of a given pre-
sumption would thus vary with each judge's receptivity to purported
statutory policies.ea
Second, an act may have several legitimate, recognized purposes,
each of which may argue for different outcomes. One purpose of the act
may dictate that a presurfiption shift the burden of persuasion to its
opponent, while another may dictate that the burden remain upon the
proponent. The National Labor Relations Act and the presumption of
majority support69 provide an example. Two congressional goals appear
in the Act: industrial stability70 and industrial democracy. 71 To pro-
66 See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
67 These "other grounds" are the factors that courts have traditionally considered in
allocating the burden of persuasion in the first instance: social policy, fairness between liti-
gants, and probability. See supra note 21. Of course, a court may not consciously consider
such factors in each case and, instead, may simply assign the burden of persuasion to the
party traditionally responsible for pleading the particular issue. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZ-
ARD, JR., sfupra note 21, § 7.8, at 251; D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 66, at 528.
Nevertheless, the factors that have determined the allocation of the burden of persuasion have
also traditionally determined the requirements of pleading. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD,
JR., supra note 19, § 7.8, at 251 (burdens of pleading and proof as "manifestations of the same
or similar considerations") (citation omitted). Therefore, allocation of the persuasion burden
according to the traditional pleading requirements will usually parallel allocation made after
a conscious consideration of the traditional factors.
68 The "prima facie" analysis common in employment discrimination cases should not
be analyzed in presumption terms because the employer-presumption opponent usually must
do more than simply rebut presumed facts. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F.
Supp. 218, 232 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (Employer not only must show no discriminatory intent, but
also must show that the requirements "bear a demonstrable relationship to successful per-
formance of the jobs for which it was used.'). Some courts, however, have relied upon pre-
sumption analysis in such cases and, consequently, have confronted rule 301. Two of these
cases illustrate how inconsistency can arise from differing sensitivities to purported statutory
policies. Compare id at 231-33 (congressional policies underlying federal anti-discrimination
statutory scheme justified shifting burden of persuasion to employer) with Brooks v. Virginia
Marine Resources Comm'n, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8204 (1977) (rule 301 applicable
and therefore claimant continued to shoulder burden).
69 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
70 See Note, Appfilication of the Good-Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumpition of Continued Majority
Status oflneumbent Unions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 718, 718 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)); supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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mote industrial stability, a judge would shift the burden of persuasion
on the majority issue to the employer, 72 while to promote industrial de-
mocracy, the judge would not shift the burden away from the NLRB.73
Thus, the effect of the presumption depends upon which competing pol-
icy the court chooses to promote. 74
Finally, the policy test forces the courts to resolve a vague question
of balance: At what mystical point do the policies of an act, assuming
that they all cut in the direction of shifting the burden of persuasion to a
presumption opponent, outweigh the congressional policy of uniformity
reflected in rule 30 1?75 This question is inherently open-ended and lacks
the internal guidelines necessary to ensure an acceptable measure of
consistency. Two recent tax penalty cases manifest this confusion and
inconsistency. The courts declined to follow the cases holding that the
tax-assessment presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the tax-
payer,76 and relied on rule 301 as the ground for their hesitancy. 77
71 See Note, supra note 25, at 663 ("Principles of industrial democracy are central to the
national labor policy.") (footnote omitted); see also Note, supra note 70, at 718 (citing 29
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 159(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
72 See Note, supra note 70, at 719; see also notes 41-44 and accompanying text. But see
Note, supra note 70, at 738-39.
73 See Note, supra note 70, at 733, 737-38; Note, supra note 25, at 662-64. But see Pennco,
Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, 716-17 (1980) (heavy evidentiary burden on employer promotes in-
dustrial democracy and stability).
74 The Ninth Circuit has consciously and explicitly subordinated the goal of industrial
democracy to that of stability. See NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir.
1980) (In applying the presumption of union majority support, "the Board has favored con-
tinuity in the bargaining structure over the enhancement of employee free choice."), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 302 (9th Cir. 1978)
("We conclude the Board did not abuse its discretion in balancing free choice and stability
when it determined that, in this instance, freedom of choice must subserve the goal of indus-
trial peace"); see also Note, supra note 70, at 719 (NLRB has "maximized industrial stability at
the expense of employee free choice by placing an unduly heavy burden on the employer to
prove that the incumbent union no longer commands the majority support of the employee
unit"; because the union is better able than the employer to prove its majority -tatus, it
should bear this burden).
75 See Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980). In Decker, the Tenth Circuit re-
viewed the censure of an investment broker who had been civilly charged with aiding and
abetting a violation of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1976), which
proscribes accepting compensation in exchange for purchase or sale of property to or for an
investment company. The court approved a presumption used by the SEC: upon proof of
the broker's conflict of interest, a presumption arose that he had violated § 80a-17(e)(1). 631
F.2d at 1385. Citing rule 301, the court held that this presumption shifted to the broker only
the burden of production: "the ultimate burden of proof remains on the Enforcement Divi-
sion to prove each element of the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence." Id
at 1385 n.7. The court refused to shift the burden of persuasion to best effectuate "the statu-
tory policy of preventing conflicts of interest." Id at 1385.
76 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
77 United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 297 (4th'Cir. 1980) (declining to decide
whether the presumption shifts both burdens or whether rule 301 prohibits shifting the bur-
den of persuasion); Osborn v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9302 (W.D. Mo.
1981) (citing Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1971), but suggesting that rule
301 prevents the assessment from shifting the burden of persuasion).
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Despite this tendency toward confusion and inconsistency, the pol-
icy test rests upon a solid premise: If Congress intended to have the op-
ponent of a judicial or statutory presumption bear the burden of
persuasion on a particular issue, rule 301 should not frustrate this intent.
The strength of the policy test stems from its recognition that "[r]ule 301
does not forbid Morgan-type presumptions-it only imposes a prefer-
ence for Thayer-type presumptions in the absence of legislative judg-
ment to the contrary. ' 78 The failings of the test stem not from its
premise, but from its inherent inability to define and confine the expan-
sive, nebulous concept of "legislative judgment."
B. The Language-Consistengy Test
The application of the language-consistency test would necessarily
derogate the policy test's purpose of effectuating congressional intent.
The language-consistency test requires an express provision in an act to
activate the exception of "not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress." Statutory presumptions alone, therefore, could fit within the ex-
ception, for common law presumptions would not involve an act of
Congress. In short, the common law presumptions used by the federal
courts could do no more than shift the burden of going forward.79
Limiting the rule 301 exception to statutory presumptions can be
squared with the premise of the policy test only if the only significant
congressional judgment on the proper allocation of the burden of per-
suasion appears in statutory language. This assumption is patently false
in light of two realities of legislative drafting. First, Congress simply
cannot resolve through the words of an act all of the issues that arise in
connection with actions brought under it; enough time and paper sim-
ply do not exist. Second, many such issues, like the allocation of the
burden of persuasion, are legal and technical in character and are unfa-
miliar concepts to many congressmen. Because of this unfamiliarity and
78 Mendez, Presumptions of Discaiminatoqy Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32
STAN. L. REv. 1129, 1160 n.162 (1980). In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the
Supreme Court applied a policy test to resolve a question analogous to that presented by the
meaning of "not otherwise provided for by an Act of Congress." In Mitchum, the Court de-
fined the parameters of the exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, which provided
that a federal court "may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) (emphasis added). The Court
faced the issue of whether a "suit in equity" to redress "the deprivation of any rights privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution," 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), fit this exception.
In holding that a § 1983 equity suit did fit this exception, the Court probed the legislative
history of § 1983, determined that § 1983 was a congressional attempt to remedy state courts'
failure to protect federal rights, and formulated the following "test": "whether an Act of
Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity,
could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 238
(emphasis added). In this context, then, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to go
beyond statutory language in ascertaining "legislative judgment."
79 See, e.g., 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, 301.02, at 14.
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these inherent limitations of passing legislation, Congress often does not
directly resolve the issue of the burden of persuasion through statutory
language.8 0 This failure to resolve expressly the issue of the burden of
persuasion, however, does not mean that Congress has failed to provide
guidance for its proper resolution.
Congressional- guidance is often buried in the legislative history of
an act. Indeed, this guidance may be such that to ignore it may lead a
court, while true to the words of the act, to frustrate its purpose. The
cases arising under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act" ' illustrate the significant role of legislative history in allocat-
ing the burden of persuasion and, more specifically, in allocating the
burden through a presumption.
The language of the Carmack Amendment does not expressly ad-
dress the burden of proof on the issue of a carrier's negligence.82 Federal
courts, however, have developed a common law presumption of a car-
rier's negligence,8 3 and a court that fails to place the burden of proof on
the carrier would be acting against congressional wishes. As the Sixth
Circuit noted in finding rule 301 inapplicable: "For well articulated
reasons Congress chose to place the burden of proof on a carrier in
whose hands goods are damaged rather than on the shipper. '8 4 The
primary basis for this presumption, the court noted, was the carrier's
superior access to the evidence bearing on the issue of its negligence.85
80 See Cleary, supra note 14, at 9 ("Unfortunately, the statute which states in so many
words the procedural effect of its terms is a rarity.').
81 49 U.S.C. § 20(11).
82 Id
83 A presumption of the carrier's negligence arises once the shipper establishes delivery
of his goods to the carrier in good condition and the return of his goods in damaged condi-
tion. See, e.g., Plough, Inc. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 630 F.2d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 1980).
Federal courts are confused over whether a carrier's negligence should even be treated as
an element of the shipper's claim, and thus be subject to presumption analysis at all. Indeed,
the word "negligence" does not appear in the Carmack amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11); see
also Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 165 n.9 (1956) (§ 20(11) is a
codification of the common law rule that the shipper need not show the carrier negligent, but
the carrier has defense of lack of negligence); United States v. Central of Ga. Ry., 411 F.
Supp. 1023, 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) ('Negligence need not be proved in actions brought
under 49 U.S.C. § 20(11).').
84 Plough, Inc. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 630 F.2d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 1980) (footnote
omitted).
85 Id at 472 n.1. The court described the presumption as "a rule akin to res ipsa loqui-
tur," without which the shipper would "often have an intolerable task to prove negligence."
Id Like the Sixth Circuit in Plough, Inc., the courts in two recent bankruptcy cases have
recognized the necessity of examining legislative history before determining whether rule 301
applies. The statutory presumption involved in these cases was the presumption of insol-
vency: "the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immedi-
ately preceding the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 547(o. In both cases the
courts ruled that the legislative history of§ 547(0 required, in accordance with rule 301, that
the burden of persuasion not shift to the debtor. In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp., 11 Bankr. 515,
519 (W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Eichorn, 11 Bankr. 81, 83 (D. Mass. 1981).
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The language-consistency test would require courts to overlook sig-
nificant congressional judgments simply because they were not expressly
stated in statutory language; it would also expand.rule 301's scope to a
much greater breadth than the rule's own history warrants. The test
would require that common law presumptions no longer shift the bur-
den of persuasion as well as the burden of production. 86 Consequently,
the test would significantly change adjudicative procedure established
well before Congress passed the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 7
This history of rule 301 does not justify such an effect on established
adjudicative procedure.88 Indeed, the legislative history of rule 301 is a
study in confusion and ineptitude. 9 Congress clearly did not under-
stand accepted presumption theory and did not fully comprehend the
problems involved. 90 Furthermore, despite the admonitions of the Advi-
86 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87 For example, in refusal to bargain cases arising under the NLRA, the Board, not the
employer, would bear the burden of persuasion on union majority status if rule 301 were
applied. Long before the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the NLRB and the courts
gave the presumption of a union's continued majority support a reformist effect, thus placing
the burden of persuasion on the employer. See, e.g., Terrel Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d
1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970). Cases decided subsequent to rule 301
have continued this practice. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
Rule 301 would also change the tax-penalty cases by placing the burden of persuasion on
the government, rather than on the taxpayer, to show responsibility and willfulness. This
allocation of the burden of persuasion, although consistent with rule 301, is inconsistent with
the allocation manifested in the cases predating the rules. See l0 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX,
supra note 1, § 301.02; supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
88 The rule proposed by the Advisory Committee, headed by Professor Edward Cleary,
and submitted to the House by the Supreme Court, embodied the Morgan approach. See
FED. R. EvID. 301 advisory committee note, reprintedin 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note
1, 301.01, at 6-10. The Advisory Committee flatly rejected the contention that its proposed
Morgan rule would violate due process, and simply assumed that its rule fell within the con-
fines of the enabling legislation. Id Furthermore, the Committee criticized bursting bubble
presumptions as too weak. Id
The House, however, rejected this reformist proposal in favor of an intermediate rule: a
presumption would not shift the burden of persuasion, but would always suffice to carry the
presumptive issue to thejury. See 10J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, SUpra note 1, 301.01, at 10-11.
Unimpressed, the Senate rejected this intermediate rule because it felt that the rule treated
presumptions as evidence, rather than merely as a means of dealing with evidence. See S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974); see also Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (testimony of David Dennis, member of the House subcommittee that drafted the
intermediate rule) (retreating from House rule, arguing that treating presumptions as evi-
dence would be a "truly grievous error," and favoring bursting bubble rule); id at 56-58
(prepared statement on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure) (intermediate rule is "an invasion of judicial function";
recommending return to reformist, Morgan-type rule). The Senate then drafted, and the
House accepted, what now stands as rule 301. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d SeAs. 9
(1974); H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 10 J. MOORE & H.
BENDIX, supra note 1, § 301.01, at 12-13.
89 See, e.g., Louisell, supra note 10, at 318-20.
90 The clearest illustration of this appears in the reports of the House and Senate Con-
ferees. Each report concludes that a presumption is merely permissive, that ajury "may," but
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sory Committee, 91 Congress apparently abandoned the Supreme Court's
proposed reformist rule primarily because of constitutional and statu-
tory concerns, and not because of a belief that reformist presumptions
yield inequitable results.92 Finally, Congress was apparently unaware of
the potential widespread and significant changes that their rule on pre-
sumptions could bring.93 In light of this confusion and uncertainty,
mechanical application of rule 301 would be nonsensical.
Despite the failings of the language-consistency test, it does have
the unquestionable advantage of promoting the Federal Evidence
Rules' primary goals of uniformity and certainty.94 By requiring express
statutory language to activate the exception of "not otherwise provided
for by Act of Congress," all common law presumptions that the federal
courts use would be given the rule 301 effect.9 5 The only candidates for
the exception, therefore, would be statutory presumptions. Moreover,
the language-consistency test, if applied strictly to the statutory lan-
need not, infer presumed facts from established basic facts. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). Of course, these reports are
inconsistent with the most fundamental attribute of presumptions, that of conditional com-
pulsion. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 9, § 67, at 533 (Senate report language has been interpreted so as to confuse pre-
sumptions with inferences). This failure to recognize the most fundamental attribute of pre-
sumptions permeated the congressional hearings. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 88, at 48
(Senator Ervin in discussion with Professor Cleary) ("But this is just a presumption. . . the
jury can disregard the presumption even in the absence of evidence.").
91 See supra note 94.
92 The position paper of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America reflects these statu-
tory and constitutional concerns. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on
Crimina/Justice ofthe House Comm. on theJudiciag, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 130-34 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as House Hearings IIJ. These concerns arose throughout the hearings. See, e.g., House
Hearings , supra note 5, at 221 (statement of New York Trial Lawyers' Committee on the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence). The House essentially adopted the Association's pro-
posed intermediate rule. Compare supra note 88 with House Hearings II, supra note 92, at 134. In
light of this similarity between the House's proposal and the Association of Trial Lawyer's
position, and considering the general prevalence of these statutory and constitutional con-
cerns, it is reasonable to assume that these were the concerns that motivated the House's
departure from the Supreme Court's Morgan-type rule. In short, the departure was moti-
vated by factors other than a widely-held and articulated belief that the Supreme Court rule
was unjust, confusing, or inefficient. But see 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21,
§ 5121, at 543 ("Although it is quite clear that the opponents [of the Supreme Court's pro-
posed rule] objected to Rule 301 on the merits as well, the basis for their objections is seldom
articulated.').
93 Congress rarely considered the actual effect that the rule would have. When it did, it
appeared preoccupied with but one possible effect: would the rule apply in res ipsa loquitur
cases? See House Hearings I, supra note 5, at 543 (testimony of Professor Cleary); see also id at
295-96 (testimony of James F. Schaeffer of the American Trial Lawyer's Association). Con-
gress did not consider the possible applicability of their rule to such long-established pre-
sumptions as that of a union's continued majority support or of the correctness of a tax
assessment. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94 See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 21, at 583.
95 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. This assumes of course, that the common
law presumption does not fit one of the other exceptions to rule 301. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
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guage, would even further narrow the category of presumptions subject
to the exception.96
IV
A PROPOSED TEST: A RECOGNITION, A MODIFICATION
Both the policy and language-consistency tests have advantages
and disadvantages. The policy test, at least theoretically, would lead to
an allocation of the burden of persuasion consistent with the congres-
sional intent reflected in the legislative history of the particular act;97
the cost, however, would be confusion and inconsistency. 98 The lan-
guage-consistency test would promote greater certainty and uniform-
ity,99 but would force the federal courts to disregard significant
congressional judgments not expressed explicitly in the statute.100 A
more appropriate test would maximize these advantages while minimiz-
ing their disadvantages. A three-pronged test accomplishes this goal.
1. If the language of the act, when analyzed in its entirety, indicates that Con-
gress intended to have the opponent of a statutogy presumption bear the bur-
den of persuasion on the presumptive issue, then the court should give the
presumption a refonnist efect.
This prong of the test recognizes the language-consistency test when
it is clearly applicable.10' It legitimately allocates the burden of persua-
sion in accordance with the congressional intent expressed in the lan-
guage of the act itself.
Courts should not interpret this prong of the proposed test so nar-
rowly as to hold Congress to an unfamiliar form of expression; for Con-
96 For example, ifjudges interpret the test to require a statute to use the language "bur-
den of persuasion," as opposed to the ambiguous "burden of proof," they would effectively
remove a substantial number of statutory presumptions from the class of candidates.
97 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Commentators appear to have simply
assumed that only the language-consistency test is appropriate. See M. GRAHAM, sura note
9, § 301.1, at 40 ("Rule 301 applies in civil actions and proceedings where federal law pro-
vides the rule of decision with the exception of those statutory presumptions as to which
Congress has specfica4'y provided that the presumption shall have some other effect.") (empha-
sis added); 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, § 301.02, at 14. But cf. P. ROTHSTEIN,
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 55 (2d ed. 1979)
("Query also, is the exception for contrary Congressional Acts meant to apply only where an
effect contrary to the rule is expressy prescribed by Congress, or will aformerjudicial gloss do the
trick?') (emphasis added). Indeed, this appears to have been the assumption of the American
Trial Lawyer's Association. See House Hearings II, supra note 92, at 133 ("Rule 301 applies
with equal force to all presumptions not express.'y excepted from its operation. . . ") (emphasis
added). Only Professors Wright and Graham have considered at length the criteria for deter-
mining when a presumption is "otherwise provided for." See 21 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM,
JR., supra note 21, § 5123, at 579-83; id § 5123, at 124-5 (Supp. 1982).
1oo See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
01 See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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gress "to otherwise provide" for a reformist presumption, an act need
not speak in terms of basic facts, presumed facts, and the burden of
persuasion. Insistence upon technical hiceties would be an unrealistic
view of legislative drafting. 10 2 Instead, courts should accord the statu-
tory words of Congress their most reasonable import.10 3 This first
prong, therefore, requires statutory language to justify departure -from
rule 301's traditional approach. 0 4
2. If the traditional considerations that wouldjusti4' allocating to the opponent
the burden of persuasion on the presumptive issue clearly guided Congress
when it considered and drafted the act, then the court should give the pre-
sumption a Morgan efect.
This prong of the test is a modification of the "policy" test.10 5 It
rests upon a similar premise: if an act's legislative history would support
an allocation of the persuasion burden to the opponent without a pre-
sumption, rule 301 should not preclude the courts from allocating the
burden in the same way through a presumption.106
102 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
103 The use of "reasonable" here does not make this a "reasonableness test." This prong
of the test involves a determination of whether Congress actually intended by the Act's lan-
guage to have the burden of persuasion shift, not whether one can reasonably argue that
Congress so intended. Therefore, if one could reasonably interpret statutory language to re-
quire the burden to shift, but the most reasonable interpretation of the language required the
burden to remain on the proponent of the presumption, then the burden must remain on the
proponent in accordance with rule 301.
104 Thus the statutory presumptions concerning patent validity, see supra notes 53-59 and
accompanying text, and of Indian title to land, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text,
would pass this test. The statutory presumptions used in black lung benefits proceedings, see
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text, because they are silent on the burden of proof,
would not.
105 See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
106 This premise is consistent with the common sense notion that allocating the burden of
persuasion through a presumption is effectively the same as allocating the burden in the first
instance; they are but different routes to the same destination. See MCCORMICK, supra note
18, § 344, at 819 (e.g., a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion on negligence is effec-
tively and logically the same as making lack of negligence an affirmative defense); Allen,
Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal CivilActions-An Anatomy of Unnecessay Ambi-
gaity and A Proposal for Refonn, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 892, 901 (1982). If Congress manifested
concerns that would justify a court in allocating to a presumption opponent the burden on
the presumptive issue in the first instance, it would be self-defeating to forbid the court from
reaching the same result simply because it used a presumption as its means.
Of course, a court could conceivably allocate the burden to the opponent in the first
instance simply by exercising its inherent power to create "assumptions," and thereby avoid
any problems posed by presumptions and rule 301. See supra note 27; see also Cleary, supra
note 14, at 21-22 (proposed method of placing the burden directly at the pleading stage).
The premise of this prong of the test should not be lumped under the name of "congres-
sional intent." Indeed, in those situations in which Congress has not specified in statutory
language the procedural effect of a presumption, one can rarely argue that Congress in-
tended, in the sense of conscious consideration and choice, to have the presumption manifest
one procedural effect rather than another. But see In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp., 11 Bankr. 515,
519 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1981) ("According to the relevant legislative history, the presumption of
insolvency in [11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(4)] 'is as defined in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
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This prong would require federal judges to weigh those considera-
tions that they have traditionally considered when allocating the burden
of persuasion in the first instance: probability, relative access to evi-
dence, and social policy.107 Because the test is to determine whether an
act, as the manifestation of congressional judgment,108 provides for a
Morgan presumption, the courts should consider only those factors that
actually guided Congress during its promulgation of the act. Con-
versely, they should ignore those factors that appear to apply under a
particular statutory scheme, but that Congress did not in fact
consider. 109
This prong of the proposed test can be applied as a disjunctive se-
ries of three conditions, each condition corresponding to a traditional
factor. If Congress clearly expressed in the legislative history (1) its be-
lief that the opponent's rebuttal of the presumptive issue would be im-
probable, 1"0 or (2) its belief that the opponent had superior access to the
evidence relevant to the presumptive issue,"' or (3) its desire to disfavor
the opponent for policy reasons on the presumptive issue, 112 then the
court should give the presumption a reformist effect.
The fundamental difference between this prong of the proposed test
and the policy test is a functional one'1 3 of providing the courts with
dence.' '). Because of their legal and technical nature, presumptions and their various proce-
dural effects are rarely the focus of overt congressional consideration. The premise of this
prong of the test, therefore, should not be interpreted to require that the legislative history of
the particular act indicate that Congress consciously chose a reformist over a Thayer effect.
Rather, it requires that the legislative history of the act clearly indicate that had Congress
considered the various procedural effects of presumptions, it would have probably chosen a
Morgan effect.
107 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
109 Thus the second prong of the test proposed in Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v.
United States, 643 F.2d 758, 763 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981), whether the
legislative history "implicitly requires" shifting the persuasion burden, is legitimate. See supra
note 31. The third prong of the proposed test, however, improperly looks to considerations
that Congress did not consider by examining the court's own view of who has better access to
the evidence. See supra note 31.
110 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
S11 See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 18, 21 and accompanying text.
113 On the other hand, the theoretical rationales of the two tests are similar. Indeed, so-
called congressional policies often grow out of, or are based upon, the three conditions. See
supra notes 110-12. For example, in Psaty v. United States the court allocated the burden of
persuasion through a presumption to the taxpayer because, among other reasons, the tax-
payer had better access to relevant facts. 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971); see also supra
note 11 and accompanying text. And in NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., the Ninth Circuit disfa-
vored the employer's contention that the union had lost majority support for policy reasons,
and placed the burden of persuasion on the employer. 584 F.2d 293, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, -442 U.S. 921 (1979); see a/so supra note 112 and accompanying text. Thus, if
Congress, in the course of drafting the relevant legislation, had clearly expressed its belief that
the taxpayer had better access to evidence relevant to a § 6672 penalty action, and that the
employer's denial of an incumbent union's majority support should be disfavored in unfair
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different starting points. The policy test requires courts to start with an
identification of general statutory policies or goals, and to shift the bur-
den of persuasion through a presumption if such a shift would better
effectuate them. The second prong of the proposed test, on the other
hand, would require courts to first identify specific instances in the legis-
lative history when Congress addressed one of the three specific factors,
and then to shift the persuasion burden only if Congress clearly ex-
pressed a desire in its discussion to effectuate the factor.
This functional difference should ensure a more acceptable measure
of consistency and certainty than the policy test. 114 By its terms, this
prong of the test requires a clear expression of affirmative congressional
belief or desire, 115 without which the act cannot be said to "otherwise
labor practice hearings, the policy test and the second prong of the proposed test would yield
the same result for essentially the same reasons.
114 Of course, this second prong would not ensure a measure of certainty comparable to
that ensured by the first prong. Congressional belief and desire, like congressional intent, are
inherently ambiguous concepts. Indeed, trying to give these concepts meaning for a specific
act inevitably raises a host of difficult questions. How can Congress, a collection of many
individuals, have one belief? And, assuming that Congress can have one belief, where would
Congress express it? In recorded debates? Position papers? Committee reports? The inherent
ambiguity of these concepts renders their application difficult, increases the chances of rea-
sonable disagreement, and consequently makes the application of any test based on them
prone to uncertainty. For a concise discussion of the dangers in searching for congressional
intent or belief in legislative materials, and of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
different materials, see Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutog' Interpretations: A Caveat,
12 J. PUB. LAW. 262 (1963).
115 To be "clear," the expression must reasonably represent an official congressional
statement. Thus, a statement of a Congressman in debate or a witness in a hearing would not
constitute a "clear" expression, while the same statement made in official congressional legis-
lative commentary would suffice. See Wasby, supra note 114, at 265 (" '[Tihe report of the
committee has. . . a higher quality than debates on the floor of the House. The representa-
tions of the latter may indeed be ascribed to the exaggerations of advocacy or opposition.' ")
(quoting with approval United States v. Caminetti, 242 U.S. 470, 499 (1917) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting)). See generaly Wasby, supra note 114, at 270-71 (advantages and disadvantages of
using committee reports in interpreting legislation).
Furthermore, to be "clear," a statement of belief or desire must bear directly on the
relevant proposition. For example, an official statement that employers should be discour-
aged from refusing to bargain with an incumbent union on the grounds of union nonmajority
is "clear," while an official statement that the goal of the NLRA is industrial stability is not.
This requirement of clarity should reduce the number of expressions activating this second
prong and, consequently, should promote greater adherence to rule 301.
Of course, the "clarity" of a congressional expression is itself often disputed. Two re-
cent labor cases in the Tenth Circuit involved such a dispute. Both of these cases involved the
application of the presumption of the propriety of a bargaining unit to bargaining units in
health care facilities. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit held that this presumption could not
shift even the burden of production, on the issue of the impropriety of a restricted bargaining
unit, to the employer. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343, 1345-47
(10th Cir. 1981); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 457 (10th
Cir. 1981), appeal pending, 455 U.S. 987 (1982). The court based its holdings upon the lan-
guage of the congressional committee reports accompanying the 1974 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act: "Due consideration should be given by the Board to prevent-
ing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry." Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric
Center, 677 F.2d at 1345 (quoting House, Senate and Senate Conference reports). Consistent
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provide." The number of such expressions are likely to be few, and
therefore this prong of the test will probably be rarely activated. 116
Although the nature of the three factors would limit the effect of
this second prong, it would not completely destroy the effect. These fac-
tors often underlie statutory policies or goals. 1 7 For example, the policy
of reducing the evidentiary burden of shippers in their suits against car-
riers is based upon the carriers' superior access to evidence pertaining to
the damages suffered by the shippers' goods. 118 In its statement of this
policy, Congress may have expressed its belief that carriers have superior
access to pertinent evidence, and thus have provided the necessary clear
affirmative belief. In any case, the Carmack-amendment presumption
would probably be valid under the third prong.
3. If, before the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress had acqui-
esced in the courts' settled practice of allowing the presumption to shij/ the
burden ofpersuasion, then the court should give the presumption a Morgan
effect.
This prong of the test is an addition to the tests implicit in the case
law. 119 The prong's legitimacy stems from the importance of congres-
sional inaction toward settled practices. By not passing remedial legisla-
tion to alter court-created reformist presumptions, Congress implicitly
stamped the practice with its approval. Consequently, by the effective
date of the Federal Rules, the reformist presumptions had become part
of the rights conferred by Congress through the act. The confused his-
tory of rule 301 does not reveal a congressional desire to change such
with this congressional mandate, the Board must "consider the trend toward broader units."
Id If read strictly, the language of the congressional reports would not satisfy the "clarity"
requirement: the reports do not directly express a congressional desire to favor either the
proponent or opponent of the presumption. However, the reports can be read broadly to
require the Board to favor the opponent of the presumption, the employer, over its propo-
nent, the General Counsel.
116 The rarity of application would be due to the infrequency with which Congress ad-
dresses the three specific factors directly and explicitly. Congressmen proposing, debating,
and drafting an act rarely express opinions on whether the truth of a particular litigant's
contention in an action under the proposed act would be improbable, whether the litigant
would have superior access to evidence, or whether the litigant, for whatever reasons, should
be disadvantaged in litigating the issue. When the members of Congress fail to express such
opinions, one cannot reasonably argue that Congress as a whole has the affirmative belief or
desire needed to activate the second prong of the test.
117 Seesura note 113.
118 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
119 The Ninth Circuit and a commentator have implied that this is a valid prong. See
NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusing to apply rule 301 to
the presumption of an incumbent union's majority support because "courts. . . approved the
presumption's use and force. . . both before and after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); P. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 99, at 55. But see 10J.
MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 1, § 301.03(2), at 18 (rule 301 applicable to common law
presumptions that previously shifted the burden of persuasion); 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, JR., supra note 21, § 5123, at 583 (rule 301 applicable to statutory presumptions inter-
preted before the Federal Rules as stronger than Thayer presumptions).
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settled procedural rights. 120
Of course, this does not mean that the courts should give a reform-
ist effect to every presumption given that effect before the passage of
Federal Rules. Indeed, congressional inaction is significant only if it in-
dicates that Congress actually acquiesced in the reformist practice. Ac-
quiescence in turn connotes awareness: Congress cannot approve of a
practice of which it is not aware. Thus, to qualify under this prong of
the test, the reformist practice in question should have been widespread
among the federal courts, of substantial duration, and well settled. If
the practice was followed in only a few circuits, or if it had emerged
recently before the Federal Rules, it probably would not qualify.121 Fi-
nally, the nature of the presumption itself will also bear upon the issue
of congressional awareness. If the presumption is merely tactical, 122 im-
puting congressional awareness again becomes more difficult; con-
versely, if the presumption affects a substantive element of a case, its
effect in litigation would have been more dramatic and the imputation
of awareness becomes more reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts should articulate clear guidelines for determin-
ing when an act of Congress provides for a presumption stronger than
rule 301's traditional "bursting bubble" effect. These guidelines should
enhance the Federal Rules' goals of uniformity and certainty. They
should not, however, dogmatically subordinate the congressional judg-
ment reflected in congressional acts to these goals through an unduly
strict reading of rule 301.
Martin McHengy
120 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
121 The long established presumptions of a union's majority status and of the correctness
of a tax assessment satisfy this prong of the test. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
122 A tactical presumption does not cover an element of a claim or defense. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 18, § 347, at 833; Cleary, supra note 14, at 25-26.
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